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• Ladies and Gentleman,  
 
• It is a great pleasure for me to address you here today, and a particular pleasure 
for me to be speaking to you at an event sponsored by Goldman Sachs JBWere.   
 
• I am grateful to the European Australian Business Council for inviting me to 
address this event. 
 
• For an international enterprise like Goldman Sachs, Australia is an important part 
of our global vision.  Some of our most important clients are here and we need to 
be here as well, which is why we are enormously proud to have linked up with JB 
Were, a firm that has over 150 years of history and a track record of exceptional 
client service.  
 
• Might I also say that as an Irishman and a keen rugby supporter, I am markedly 
less delighted to have landed in Australia just in time to witness Ireland’s dismal 
thrashing at the hands of the Wallabies.  
 
• I’ve been asked today to provide some personal reflections on the EU’s single 
market programme, how that programme is relevant to the phenomenon of 
globalisation and where the EU’s current efforts in the field of financial services 
fits in. 
 
• I see European integration and globalization as two sides of the same process.  
One of the most compelling reasons for advancing further towards an 'ever-closer 
union' in Europe is the imperative need for an adequate response, and 
contribution to, globalisation. We have a very rapidly changing, unstable external 
world around us. The world needs a strong, stable and prosperous European Union 
not merely as an example but as a participant. 
 
• As with European integration, globalisation is redefining our notions of 
sovereignty.  No single government – even the strongest – can any longer control, 
by itself, the growing interdependence between economies.  Cooperation amongst 
countries and regions is thus increasingly necessary to achieve social and 
economic objectives. Where governments can exert power, in many cases it is a 
negative power.  Their actions can determine a whether a country or region will 
remain equipped to take advantage of globalisation that is to become winners or 
losers. 
 
• There are several schools of thought concerning the mythology of globalisation. 
The first is that the process is simply a reflection of technological developments 
which have taken economic and other policy management out of the hands of 
government.  Thus, telecommunications coupled with deregulation supposedly 
make financial markets almost uncontrollable, with developing countries too 
often the innocent victims as their currencies fall to speculation.  
 
• The second is that it is a giant conspiracy between corporations, aided and abetted 
by governments and international institutions like the European Union, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. 
This notion was at the root of much of the protest in the streets of Seattle at the 
end of 1999 and at various subsequent meetings of international institutions. 
 
• Neither of these theories stands up to examination. The reality is that 
globalisation is neither especially new - arguably the nineteenth century was more 
globalised than the end of the twentieth - or the result of any one easily 
identified trend. Rather, it is the combined result of many changes, some recent 
and some not so recent.  
 
• It reflects the gradual decline in trade barriers through the efforts of regional and 
international bodies such as the European Union and the GATT and WTO over 
some fifty years. It reflects the only marginally more recent change from fixed to 
market-dictated exchange rates for the main currencies. And it reflects a twenty-
year move away from government direction of economies to greater market 
orientation through privatisation and deregulation.  
 
• What one can say is that all these processes and trends have made the world a 
very different place and it is clearly going to continue to change, perhaps at an 
even faster rate. The real challenge is making sure that we can sustain it without a 
retreat into protectionism or conflict. 
 
• One of the positive influences, I believe, on the process of globalisation has been 
the effect of European economic integration.  
 
• Without European integration we would not have had a Uruguay Round or a WTO 
and without these we would not have had globalisation as we have experienced it.  
 
• Had the European nation states negotiated individually in global trade rounds we 
would still be talking with no end in sight and while some elements of 
globalisation might exist today, other components in the process would be absent.  
 
• Today for the first time in the economic sphere we are living by rules interpreted 
by a system of adjudication. Whilst this system is not secured by a capacity to 
enforce WTO decisions through national courts (as is the case in the EU) it still 
represents a significant inhibition on the freedom of action of nation states. 
Sovereignty may not be challenged as directly as it is in the European Union but it 
is certainly subject to some limitations.  
 
• Europeans were the first to learn to live with such constraints on our freedom of 
action because the benefits are clearly seen to outweigh perceived costs. European 
integration and the single market program are a conscious pooling of sovereignty.   
 
• Increasingly in the EU national political priorities and economic policies have to be 
worked out in the context of, and constrained by, EU institutions and EU policies.  
 
• The rules of the EMU Stability and Growth Pact are perhaps the most visible 
manifestation of this – even limiting the ability of governments to implement 
promised tax cuts and spending increases. 
• The single market, with its strong emphasis on deregulation and encouraging 
competition, has already brought enormous benefits to Europe’s economy. 
 
• If one looked back to the late 1980s, nobody would have foreseen then what has 
been achieved in Europe in terms of liberalisation of the European economy.   
 
• A single market, free movement of goods, capital, services and people and the 
creation of a single currency.   
 
• Who could have believed that the European Commission, with its limited 
resources, could have driven a privatisation process that has increased 
competition in telecoms, financial services and, increasingly, the energy sector?  
This reform process is unprecedented in scale and scope, and without it, Europe 
would have become an economic backwater. 
 
• However, the single market remains incomplete.  It is particularly important to 
achieve a genuine single market for services.  Key services sectors like energy, 
financial services and telecoms are “economic lubricants”. 
• They form a significant part of the cost base of most, if not all, economic activity. 
It is very difficult to have a competitive economy and globally competitive 
businesses if you are saddled with inefficient and expensive service provision.   
• That is why the EU’s efforts to liberalise these sectors and to open them up to 
competition are so strongly supported by businesses across the European 
continent and beyond. 
• Competition policy is another fundamental aspect of the EU’s economic 
governance.  For business and the financial markets, the most closely watched 
policy area is merger control.  But equally important, perhaps more so for the 
economy as a whole, are the constraints placed on governments by EU state aid 
policy. 
 
• In an integrated market, there is, or should be, no room for distortive subsidies. 
One of the EU’s major achievements in seeking to create a single market has been 
to tackle the practice of state aids to failing industries, a practice that is 
inefficient and costly to taxpayers.  
 
• Competition is the driving force behind dynamism and innovation. Subsidies 
distort it, and only delay the necessary structural change. Moreover, subsidies 
granted by individual Member States or regions are simply not compatible with 
increasingly integrated markets.  
 
• It is in the OVERALL interests of a competitive European economy to have state 
aid policed by the Commission.  The Commission was entrusted with the role of 
supervising State aid, because only by doing so, would that supervision be 
exercised independently.  
 
• In March 2000 at Lisbon, EU leaders committed themselves to a host of market-
oriented economic reforms aimed at boosting the competitiveness of the EU 
economy and creating the world’s “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy” by 2010. 
 
• Looking back to the mid-to-late 1990s, it is possible to recall the strong belief 
among European policymakers that a major reason for the EU’s lagging economic 
performance (when compared primarily with the US) was the greater scale and 
efficiency of US capital markets and the EU’s historical reliance on bank financing. 
 
• The underdevelopment of funded pensions in most EU countries was identified as 
a major factor in this difference.  
 
• The Commission’s Framework for Action document of 1998 highlighted this 
difference, noting that stock market capitalisation in the EU (with the exception 
of the UK and Netherlands) pales into insignificance when compared to that of 
US.  At that time, the figures were 32% of EU GDP compared to over 100% in US.   
 
• The desire was to make listing and trading of securities cheaper so that more 
companies, including more small and medium sized companies would be able to 
tap the capital markets and raise capital directly from the markets.  
 
• By doing so, a virtuous circle would be set in motion: cost of capital would be 
reduced, investment returns would increase, more savings would be able to be 
invested in the markets. 
 
• European companies would be able to compete on more even terms with US firms 
if their financing costs could be reduced to similar levels. 
 
• This belief was one of the motivating factors behind the conception and adoption 
of the EU Financial Services Action Plan, and explains the Action Plan’s particular 
focus on “ensuring a single market for wholesale financial services”.  
 
• A number of useful studies – most recently those by London Economics (on behalf 
of the European Commission) – have demonstrated the aggregate benefits for the 
EU as a whole if truly integrated financial markets can be delivered.  
 
• To cite just a few figures from the London Economics study. 
 
• As a result of the combined reduction in the cost of equity, bond and bank 
finance, together with the increase in the share of bond finance in total debt 
finance, potential benefits include: 
 
o An increase in EU-wide GDP of 1.1%, or €130 billion in 2002 prices, in the 
long-run;  
o An increase in total business investment of almost 6.0% and an increase in 
private consumption of approximately 0.8%;   
o and an increase in total employment of half a percent. 
• There may also be further, less easily measured, benefits from the creation of a 
genuine single market in this area. For example cost savings arising from 
consolidation of Europe’s fragmented national banking sectors, or resulting from 
increased competition between providers, more innovative services, and so on. 
• Clearly, such economic benefits would be incredibly positive not just to the EU, 
increasing its attractiveness as a target for investment, but to the world by 
increasing European demand and providing a boost to global trade and growth.  
• So the instincts of those who first proposed EU action in this area have been 
borne out by academic research, if not yet by concrete results. 
• The European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan, published in 1999, was 
a package of reforms and new legislative initiatives with the ultimate goal of 
creating integrated European capital markets, and a single market in financial 
services.  
 
• It is undoubtedly the case that increasingly the direction AND detail of financial 
regulation is being set at the EU level.  This is a marked shift from what has gone 
before and poses a number of challenges for the EU, national authorise and 
industry. 
 
• As Callum McCarthy, the new Chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority 
noted in his maiden speech earlier this month. The financial services industry in 
Europe faces, over the period 2004 to 2008, the task of implementing more than 
14 major EU legislative measures. At least eight of these measures have completed 
the primary legislative process in the EU.  
 
• These include, the International Accounting Standards Regulation and directives 
such as the Prospectus Directive, Collateral, Investment Services Directive and 
Market Abuse Directive.  
 
• Each of these will require financial institutions across Europe to make substantial 
efforts to prepare for implementation over the next 12 months. Speaking as 
someone involved in the securities industry, I can testify to the significance of this 
project, its impact on the markets, and the importance that market participants 
therefore attach to getting the constituent legislation right.   
• For each of these measures, the test the market will apply and the test that the EU 
institutions, particularly the Commission, should apply is:  
 
- will this proposal increase competition in the European financial markets? 
 
- will it reduce costs for issuers, intermediaries and investors? 
 
- does it further the Action Plan goal of creating deeper, more liquid, and more 
efficient capital markets in Europe? 
 
• My overall assessment of those Action Plan measures which have been adopted so 
far or which are currently under discussion, if measured against this standard, is 
that they are something of a mixed bag. 
• Some measures will genuinely further the integration of the EU’s capital markets 
by providing greater legal certainty (e.g. Collateral Directive) or by making it 
easier to do cross-border business on the basis of home country rules (e.g. certain 
aspects of the Investment Services Directive and the Prospectus Directive).  
• Others will raise regulatory and prudential standards, with the intention of 
increasing investor confidence in markets and financial institutions (e.g. Capital 
Adequacy Directive, Market Abuse Directive). 
• However, I detect that for a number of initiatives, the original Action Plan goals of 
integrating markets, removing barriers, and allowing the full force of competition 
to be felt in this sector have been made subordinate to a tendency, particularly on 
the part of national authorities, towards overly prescriptive legislation and, in the 
extreme, protection of markets (or rather market participants). 
• What still seems to be lacking is basic trust between national authorities in each 
other’s ability or willingness to apply the rules as agreed.  
• It is this lack of trust, which leads to situations like that which arose during 
discussions last year on the Prospectus Directive. 
• Amazingly, in the context of a directive that introduces far greater levels of 
disclosure than had previously existed in the majority of Member States, it still 
proved incredibly difficult to reach agreement on allowing corporate issuers to 
retain the existing ability to decide which competent authority to apply to for 
review of their prospectus.  
• Resistance to issuer choice stemmed almost entirely from unwillingness on the 
part of regulators to give up an element of control over “their” companies.  
• Were it not for some clear headed decisions by a number of governments to 
overrule their regulators and take a more Single Market inspired position, we 
might have been facing disastrous or at least hugely expensive consequences for 
European corporate bond issuance.  
• It is instructive to contrast this continued lack of trust between EU authorities 
with the forward looking approach adopted by the Australian regulator to 
permitting cross-border provision of wholesale financial services without licensing 
requirements – provided they are subject to regulation that ensures “sufficiently 
equivalent” outcomes to Australia’s regulatory framework. 
• Mutual trust and a desire to accommodate different market models have also 
been notably absent in the recent debate over the EU’s new Investment Services 
Directive.   
• Also missing from that debate has been the resolve to stand firm against 
regulatory protectionism and to focus on removal of barriers. 
• The Investment Services Directive covers a range of critical issues ranging from 
the rules for stock exchanges and other regulated markets through to the 
“Conduct of Business Rules” governing banks’ relations with customers.  
• The draft text was, in most respects, a well thought through and balanced 
document that benefited hugely from the extensive consultations undertaken by 
the Commission prior to publication. 
• In my view, however, some of the proposed provisions run the risk of 
inappropriately prescribing the structure of EU securities markets.   
• This was true of the Commission’s original proposed treatment of off-exchange 
share trading, which is my view was a clear case of precautionary and ill informed 
regulation.  
• In particular, by penalising firms that provide liquidity to their institutional clients 
– they ran the serious risk of reducing overall market liquidity in Europe.  
• Despite improvements to the proposal made by the European parliament and, to a 
lesser extent, member governments, there is a distinct possibility that the ISD will 
raise trading costs for institutional investors and thus defeat one of the purposes 
of the Action Plan. 
• Making it more costly for investors to enter and exit large trading positions will 
eventually make Europe’s capital markets less attractive – thus increasing the 
costs for European companies wishing to raise capital.  
• Such an outcome flies in the face of the overall objectives of the Action Plan and, 
it is to be hoped, can still be avoided. 
• It is crucial that in negotiating the final shape of the Investment Services 
Directive, or any other Action Plan measure, no additional requirement be 
regarded as “cost free”. There is always a cost attached to regulation, particularly 
when that regulation stands in the way of true competition.   
• As the EU has worked its way through the Financial Services Action Plan, the 
extent to which the financial markets, particularly at the wholesale end, are 
already globalised has become apparent.  
 
• I think it is fair to say that this is a factor that was not fully understood or 
appreciated by policy makers. In particular, the extent to which foreign companies 
issue non-equity securities in the EU was initially not well enough understood and 
came as something of a revelation to many. 
• However, it is a fact that international business understands very well.  
 
• 19 Australian companies have equity listings on the London Stock Exchange.  And 
I am sure many more rely on the Eurobond markets for debt issuance programmes.   
 
• And yet the international bond market is the one area where the EU can genuinely 
claim to have a lead on the US.  
 
• It is imperative therefore that Action Plan measures not erode the competitive 
advantage presently enjoyed by the EU in this area. 
 
• Too many Action Plan measures have insufficiently taken into account the 
specificities – not the mention the largely professional nature – of the debt 
markets.   
 
• Protection of retail investors is obviously a legitimate policy objective of the EU.   
 
• However, I must say, there has been a tendency in directives like the Prospectus 
Directive and the snappily named:  
 
• “Directive on Transparency Obligations of with securities admitted to trading on a 
regulated market”  
 
• to think always in terms of plain equity securities and then to apply the sorts of 
protections that might be necessary for investors in such securities to the full 
range of financial instruments. 
 
• It is all very well to say that all issuers of securities in the EU should meet the 
same standards of transparency.  But when over half of your market is made up of 
issuance is by foreign issuers, and when meeting the same standards might mean 
restating your accounts under a different accounting code, then Europe runs the 
risk of simply putting issuers off.  
 
• So what is the solution?  Increasingly, I observe that the EU and governments 
around the world need to step carefully when drafting legislation and regulations 
for what is now a global financial services business.   
 
• We need to try to do better to avoid unintended consequences or to introduce 
complexity that can impose excessive cost.  We need to consult more closely with 
other jurisdictions and with business on the underlying purpose of regulation. 
 
• The Commission, in particular, has a duty to ensure that proposed regulations are 
formulated with a view to ensuring a high standard of quality. If achieving quality 
takes more time and consultation it should allow this. A tick box approach based 
on artificial political timetables will not increase credibility and as has been shown 
in some instances will do more harm than good. On the other hand, where the 
Commission stands by a quality solution, then Europe and the world will benefit 
greatly. 
 
• Business and government must maintain regular communication and dialogue on 
key economic and financial issues.  We must ensure that effective mechanisms 
exist to reduce and resolve strains where they exist and encourage mutual 
recognition and convergence on regulatory best practice.    
 
• An important phase of work is reaching an end.  Though further initiatives in the 
field of financial services will undoubtedly be brought forward. It seems unlikely 
that a second action plan will be required.   
 
• Over the next 12 months, the EU will have to decide how it builds on the work 
already carried out in the Action Plan. 
 
• Only by focussing on the international competitiveness of its financial markets 
will the EU ensure that they are capable of being even more important to the 
global economy.  
 
• Ladies and Gentlemen, this is something I lend my wholehearted support and 
backing to.   
 
